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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900078-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a
motion to suppress in the Sixth Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-2(e) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was the inventory search of defendant's vehicle

2.

Did defendant consent to the blood test?

proper?

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings,
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" standard of
review.

State v. Johnson, 771, P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
places to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14.
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with automobile homicide, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207
(Supp. 1989); possession of marijuana, a class "B" misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989);
and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class "B" misdemeanor,
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1989).

A hearing

on defendant's motion to suppress was held January 4, 1990, in
the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Garfield County,
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge, presiding (R. 69, T. 1).
This Court granted an interlocutory appeal from Judge Tibbs'
order denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 82).

The transcript of the suppression hearing is designated as MT
The preliminary hearing transcript is designated as "P." The
record is designated as MR."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 23, 1989, between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m., a Ford
Bronco driven by defendant went off the road and collided with an
embankment on the Bullfrog-Notom Road near the Burr Trail in
Garfield County (P. 17, 19, 107). Four persons were in the
vehicle, defendant, his wife, Donald Dudry, and Michelle Eckroth
(P. 55-56, 104-05, 108-09).
Deputy Shawn Draper of the Garfield County Sheriff's
Department arrived at the accident scene at approximately 3:00
p.m.

(P. 17). Draper was the only sheriff's deputy patrolling

the remote area (T. 47). Draper surveyed the accident scene and
aided the injured passengers (P. 18). At the scene, defendant
approached Draper and asked him to take custody of some firearms
in defendant's possession.

Ici. The conversation ended as

defendant joined his wife and Dudrey in the ambulance (P. 19).
A helicopter arrived to transport Ekroth to the
hospital in Page, Arizona (P. 25. 40). The ambulance transported
the other victims to the nearby Bullfrog Clinic (P. 25, 39, 42).
Draper remained to secure defendant's vehicle and wait for the
tow truck to arrive.

Ici. While waiting, Draper picked up some

pillows, blankets, and other items that were left at the scene.
Id.

However, when he tried to put them in defendant's vehicle,

he discovered that defendant had locked the vehicle before
leaving in the ambulance (P. 25, T. 51). When the tow truck
arrived, Draper and the tow truck driver used a "slim jim" to
open defendant's vehicle (P. 25-26, 28, T. 51).
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Draper considered the position and location of
defendant's vehicle a hazard to itself and other traffic (P. 2930, T. 49) (See Addendum "A"; Photo).

The vehicle was inoperable

and the windshield was broken, apparently when it was struck by
Ms. Eckroth's head (P. 29, T. 62). Prior to towing the vehicle,
Draper conducted an inventory of the contents of the vehicle (P.
25-26, 27-28, T. 50) (See Addendum "B"; Inventory List).

Draper

followed the Garfield County Sheriff Department's procedures for
conducting an inventory search (P. 26, T. 51, 53) (See Addendum
"C"; Inventory Procedure).

During the inventory, Draper opened a

film canister containing a green, leafy substance which he
suspected was marijuana (P. 26, 31-32, 54, T. 55-56, 64).
Draper suspended his inventory search when he was
notified that defendant would not be transported to Page, Arizona
with the other victims (P. 39, T. 54). He proceeded to the
Bullfrog Clinic to obtain a blood sample from defendant (P. 38,
T. 54). Meanwhile, defendant's vehicle was towed to Draper's
home in Ticaboo, Utah (T. 65).
At the Bullfrog Clinic, Draper read defendant a
standard DUI form and informed defendant he needed to take a
blood test (P. 44). Peter Hollis, a licensed physician's
assistant, explained to defendant that Draper wanted him to draw
2
defendant's blood and asked for defendant's consent (T. 13).
Defendant said, "Yes. Go ahead and do it." Id.

Under the Bullfrog Clinic's written policy, Hollis could draw
blood for DUI tests only if requested by a peace officer and if
the patient consented (T. 10) (See Addendum "D"; Policy).
_A_

Defendant's vehicle was later towed to the State's
impound lot in Hanksville, Utah (T. 70). When Draper was able to
resume his inventory of the vehicle, he found drug paraphernalia
in a closed tupperware container (P. 46-49, T. 56).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Deputy Draper conducted a lawful inventory search.
While defendant argues that his rights were violated under both
the Utah and federal constitutions, his lack of separate state
analysis bars consideration of the state constitutional claim.
With regard to defendant's federal claim, three valid reasons
exist for inventory searches: protection of the owner's property;
protection for police against claims of damaged or stolen
property; and protection of police from potential danger.
In the instant case, Draper acted prudently in securing
defendant's vehicle and having it towed since defendant's vehicle
was partially protruding into the road and had a broken
windshield.

Likewise, Draper's bifurcated inventory search was

necessitated by the remoteness of the area, the lack of other law
enforcement personnel to complete the inventory, and the need for
Draper to obtain a blood sample from defendant.

Defendant's

claim that the deputy should have opened all containers is absurd
since opening containers of food would violate the purpose behind
inventory searches. Also meritless is defendant's claim that the
lack of the tow truck driver's signature on the inventory should
invalidate the search.

Finally, defendant misreads the record

when he asserts the deputy conducted an inventory search of the
vehicle prior to impoundment.
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Because defendant gave actual consent to withdraw his
blood, the implied consent law is inapplicable.

The trial court

properly found that defendant consented to the blood test when
the physician's assistant asked for consent and defendant
responded, "Yes. Go ahead and do it".

Defendant did not testify

and no evidence of coercion was offered.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEPUTY DRAPER CONDUCTED A LAWFUL INVENTORY
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.
Defendant complains that Deputy Draper did not conduct
a lawful inventory search of defendant's vehicle because Draper
did not scrupulously comply with Garfield County's vehicle
inventory policy.

Defendant claims Draper's actions violated

both the United States and Utah constitutions.

Defendant's claim

should be rejected.
A.

DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM FOR APPEAL.

While defendant's motion to suppress mentioned both the
state and federal constitutions, defendant did not separately
argue state constitutional grounds except to make a conclusory
statement that his state constitutional rights were violated (R.
55-56).

This Court has previously stated, "Nominally alluding to

such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis
before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the issue to
permit consideration by this court on appeal."

State v. Johnson,

771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989) (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.
_£_

App. 1987)).

Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has declined to

make a separate analysis of article I, section 14 when a
defendant does not assert that the state constitution provides
greater protection than the federal constitution.

State v.

Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087 n.2 (Utah 1986). See also State v.
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 31 n.l (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62
(1989); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986).

Cf. State

v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring)
The lower court in the present case had no state
constitutional arguments before it and could only decide the
issue based on defendant's rights under the United States
Constitution.

See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 555 A.2d 369, 376-77

(Vt.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1155 (1989).

As pointed out by

the Utah Supreme Court, "motions to suppress should be supported
by precise averments, not conclusive allegations."

State v.

Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted).

Since

defendant did not argue a violation of his state constitutional
rights in any meaningful way in the court below, this Court
should decline to consider his state constitutional claim on
appeal.
B.

DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED.

Defendant asserts that the present case is governed by
the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367
(1987), and this Court's interpretation of Bertine in State v.
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
defendant complains that:

Specifically,

(1) the Garfield County policies do
-7-

not provide guidance on when a vehicle should be impounded; (2)
the policies do not provide for bifurcated searches; (3) Deputy
Draper did not open all containers in defendant's vehicle; (4)
the tow truck driver's signature was not affixed on the inventory
list; and (5) the inventory search occurred prior to impoundment.
Defendant's arguments must fail.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Judge Tibbs
found that Draper followed proper standardized procedures in
conducting the inventory search (T. 86) (See Addendum "E";
Findings; Conclusions).

Based upon these factual findings, Judge

Tibbs concluded that the inventory search was reasonable and that
Deputy Draper acted in good faith and not for the purpose of a
criminal investigation.

On appeal, this Court should not disturb

a lower court's factual assessments underlying its decision to
deny the suppression motion unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327.

Findings are clearly

erroneous only when they are against the clear weight of the
evidence or when the appellate court is convinced that a mistake
has been made.

State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct.

App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah
1990).

A correction of error standard should be applied to the

lower court's legal conclusions.

Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327.

The seminal case on automobile inventory searches is
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1975).

In Opperman, the

Supreme Court noted that automobiles are frequently taken into
custody, particularly as the result of automobile accidents.
at 368.

Id.

"To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some

•ft-

circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles
will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest
of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control
activities."

Id. at 368-69. The Court explained that inventory

searches meet three different needs:

(1) protection of the

owner's property; and (2) protection for police against claims of
damaged or stolen property; and (3) the protection of the police
from potential danger. JEd. at 369.

See also Illinois v.

Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
Prior to Opperman, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a bifurcated search of a murder suspect's automobile
because the police thought the suspect, a Chicago police officer,
might have his service revolver in the automobile's trunk.
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 436 (1973).

Cady

The Supreme Court

reasoned that the police acted correctly in suspecting that the
general public might be endangered if an intruder removed a
revolver from the trunk of the vehicle.

Id. at 447.

Subsequently, the Court held that police officers may
open closed containers while conducting a routine inventory
search of an impounded vehicle so long as such inventories are
conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76. The Bertine Court
noted, "Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise
of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity."
375.

Jto. at

Last term, the Supreme Court clarified its Bertine
holding in Florida v. Wellsf 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).

The Supreme

Court held that M[a] police officer may be allowed sufficient
latitude to determine whether a particular container should or
should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and
characteristics of the container itself."

1^-

at

1635.

The

Court went on to note, "The allowance of the exercise of judgment
based on concerns related to the purposes of an inventory search
does not violate the Fourth Amendment."

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court also analyzed the purposes
behind an inventory search of an automobile in State v. Hygh, 711
P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).

In Hygh, the Supreme Court held that the

State has the burden of establishing the necessity of taking an
inventory of a vehicle.

IdL at 268.

The Hygh court was

particularly concerned with the search because it seemed apparent
that the inventory was nothing more than a pretext for conducting
an investigative search.

JEd. at 270.

See also State v. Johnson/

745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987).
This Court has also addressed the issue of what
constitutes a valid inventory search.
P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

State v. Shamblin, 763

The Shamblin Court read Bertine

to require standardized, specific procedures mandating the
opening of all closed containers in order to prevent police
officers from acting arbitrarily and selectively while conducting
inventory searches.

Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 428-29.

However, the

recent Wells decision casts doubt on requiring police to be this
rigid.

Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.

1.

IMPOUNDMENT PROCEDURES.

Addressing each of defendant's assertions in turn, he
first argues that the fruits of the inventory search should be
suppressed because Garfield County does not have standardized
criteria for determining when a vehicle should be impounded.
Defendant's claim is meritless.
In the absence of specific statutory authority upon
which to justify the impoundment of a vehicle, a court must "look
to the circumstances surrounding the stop to determine whether
the impound was reasonable." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268. In
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme
Court reiterated that "the existence or absence of justification
for the impoundment of an automobile may be determined from the
surrounding circumstances." 3jd. (citing State v. Rice, 717 P.2d
695, 696 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268.) There, the
Court found justification for impoundment where (1) the vehicle
was parked in the middle of a motel parking lot blocking traffic,
(2) the vehicle had an out-of-town sticker in lieu of license
plates, (3) the defendant did not have a driver's license, and
(4) the defendant and his friends who were present were under
arrest for being under the influence of a controlled substance.
Johnson, 745 P.2d at 454. Under these circumstances, the Los
Angeles police officer was found justified in impounding the
vehicle which could not have been properly moved by the defendant
or his friends. Id. See also People v. Scigliano# 196 Cal. App.
3d 26, 241 Cal. Rptr. 546, 548 (1987) (police properly impounded
vehicle without windshield).
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In the instant case, defendant's incapacitated Bronco
had a broken windshield and was sitting on the road at an angle
partially blocking one lane of traffic.

It presented a hazard to

all oncoming traffic and was incapable of moving under its own
power (P. 29-30, T. 49, 50, 62) (See Addendum "A"; Photo).
Defendant and his passengers were injured and had been
transported by ambulance and helicopter to medical care
facilities.

Under these circumstances, Draper not only had

justification to take control over the vehicle, but would have
been derelict in his duty not to do so.

Thus, the absence of

standardized procedures for determining when to impound a vehicle
should not be a constitutional defect when the impoundment was
clearly reasonable under the circumstances.
2.

BIFURCATED INVENTORY SEARCHES.

Next, defendant asserts the inventory search evidence
should be suppressed because the Garfield County policy does not
provide for bifurcated inventory searches.

Defendant's claim

must fail.
Bifurcated searches, by themselves, have never
constituted a constitutional violation.

The search in Cady v.

Dombrowski, for example, occurred in two parts.

There, the Court

attached no significance to a bifurcated search of a vehicle,
conducted pursuant to standard police procedure for the
protection of the public, in which officers sought a revolver
they believed the defendant was carrying.
443.

413 U.S. at 436-37,

A search of the defendant's vehicle was conducted at the

scene of the accident in which it was involved and later at a
garage to which it had been towed. I^d. at 436-37.

Likewise, in State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court attached no significance to the
fact that officers made a preliminary search of an automobile,
had it towed, and then conducted a full inventory search at the
impound lot.

The obvious point of Cady, and Earl is that if both

parts of the bifurcated warrantless search are legally justified,
there is no fourth amendment violation.

£f. United States v.

Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 959 (11th Cir. 1990) (police may not in the
absence of a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement
re-examine, for evidentiary purposes, items previously
inventoried).
In the instant case, Deputy Draper suspended the
inventory search because he was notified that defendant would not
be transported to Page, Arizona (T. 54). As the only deputy in
the area, Draper had to prioritize his duties (T. 80). Draper
testified that he intended to secure a blood sample, and then
complete the inventory (T. 54). He also needed to complete his
investigation of the accident scene and transport a prisoner (T.
76, 81). Considering the exigent circumstances, it was not
unreasonable for Draper to complete his inventory search
subsequent to his other duties. Defendant does not claim that
either of Draper's inventory searches, standing alone, violated
the fourth amendment.

Therefore, his challenge to the bifurcated

inventory search is meritless.
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3.

CLOSED CONTAINERS.

Next, defendant complains that Draper, in conducting
3
the inventory search, did not open all closed containers.
Specifically, defendant urges the suppression of the marijuana
and drug paraphernalia because Draper did not open "food boxes"
or "cans of food" (T. 73-74).

Defendant's assertion is absurd.

As noted above, three legitimate purposes exist for an
inventory search: (1) protection of the owner's property; (2)
protection for police against damaged or stolen property; and (3)
the protection of the police from potential danger.
428 U.S. at 369.

Opperman,

In State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988), this Court interpreted Bertine to "establish that the
Fourth Amendment ijs violated if closed containers are opened
during a vehicle inventory search in the absence of a
standardized, specific procedure mandating their opening." Ici. at
427-28 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

In a

footnote, this Court stated that the same result is reached
through a different analysis apparently adopted by at least five
Bertine justices, i.e., that "'it is permissible for police
officers to open closed containers in an inventory search only if
they are following standard police procedures that mandate the
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle.'" JEd. at
428 n.6 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376-77 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).

Thus, this Court suggested that a "'total absence

The Garfield County Sheriff's Department written policy
requires that a "written inventory shall be made of all contents
of vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers."
(See Addendum "C"; Inventory Procedures)
-14-
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Shamblin Court, based on its reading of Bertine, is no longer
4
viable.
Applying the Wells standard to the present case, Fourth
Amendment procedures were followed.

Deputy Draper testified that

he opened all containers in the vehicle, except "food boxes" and
"cans of food" (T. 73-74).

While the standardized procedures he

followed required a written inventory of all contents of "opened,
closed and/or locked containers," he believed that the intent of
the policy was not to open "cans of food, etc." (T. 74) (Addendum
"C"; Inventory Procedures).

Indeed, opening cans of food for

spoilage would cut directly against one of the stated purposes of
inventorying vehicle contents, i.e., to protect the vehicle
owner's property.

See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.

Food boxes and cans of food, particularly if
commercially sealed, would fit within the Wells description of
containers whose contents officers may ascertain by examining the
containers' exteriors.

See Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635. By

allowing police officers to exercise some common-sense
discretion, an officer should be permitted to note on her written
inventory list that the minister's picnic basket, grandma's
knitting bag, the biker's tool box, or the gypsy's satchel
contains a sealed tin of Copenhagen snuff. £f. Shamblin 763 P.2d
at 428.

Certainly, an officer's decision not to open "food

It must be noted that three separate concurrences in Wells,
joined by an aggregate of four justices, criticized the majority
opinion for rejecting, in dictum, the "all or nothing" test.
Wells, 110 S.Ct. at 1635-40. However, dictum or not, the clear
majority interprets Bertine to allow some discretion by police
officers in conducting inventory searches. Ijd. at 1635.
_1 C_

boxes" oi" "cans of iv ' 'I

should not invalidate an otherwise

*j» t n n search conducted in good faith in accordance

proper

with s tandardized wr11ten procedui ow ,
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Conclusions) .
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contents (T, 79 |

He stated that he did not suspect that.
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contraband
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Id.
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5
Q ar £j_ e 2 >c j c o u n t y Sheri f:l:J s Department procedure on
inventory searches states that '[w]hen custody of the wreliicl e
changes from one person to another, the person taking custody of
the vehicle shall also assume custody of the contents by placing
his/her signature
on the inventory list," ( T . 65-66)(See
Addendum M/n,H - Inventory Procedure).
T^e

Il I -

However, both Bertine and Shamblin deal with the conduct of the
actual inventory search, not the ministerial function of
transferring custody*

In actuality, defendant's claim is a chain

of custody issue which does not involve search and seizure
principles.

In the absence of a claim that he was prejudiced by

the lack of the tow truck driver's signature, defendant's chain
of custody claim should be disregarded.
5.

IMPOUNDMENT BEFORE INVENTORY.

Defendant claims that the inventory occurred prior to
impoundment.

Defendant misreads the facts.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense
counsel asked Draper when he thought the vehicle had been
"impounded" (T. 74). Draper responded that he thought the
vehicle was impounded when the sheriff told him the vehicle would
be held for forfeiture.

Ici. However, on redirect examination,

Draper testified that his understanding of the word "impound"
meant when the state or the county takes "possession" of the
vehicle (T. 80). Draper said that he was in "custody" of the
vehicle, was holding it for the owner, and needed to secure the
vehicle and its contents (T. 80-81).
Based upon this testimony, Judge Tibbs specifically
found that (1) defendant's vehicle was left unattended partially
blocking one lane of the road and creating a potential danger to
traffic safety; (2) Deputy Draper impounded the vehicle due to
his concern for public safety, the absence of its occupants, and
the lack of alternative arrangements; and (3) Deputy Draper
conducted an at the scene inventory search of the vehicle for the
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In Pascoe, the defendant was the driver of a pickup
truck which crossed the center line, struck an oncoming vehicle,
and killed the other driver instantly. Id. at 513.

The defendant

was transported to the hospital for treatment of his injuries.
Id.

At the hospital, police officers informed the defendant that

they wanted a blood sample because they had probable cause to
believe that the defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol. Jd.

The defendant responded, "Okay," and extended his

arm for the technician to draw blood. Jd.

At a pretrial motion

to suppress the blood test results, the trial court found that
even if the defendant was not under arrest for purposes of the
implied consent statute, he had consented to the blood test and
therefore the results were admissible.

On appeal, this Court

found that because actual consent was given, it was unnecessary
for the defendant to be arrested prior to the blood test.

3xi. at

514 (citing State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 307, 309
(1968)).
In the present case, defendant consented to the blood
test.

Deputy Draper told defendant that in an accident resulting

in an injury, he was required to give a blood sample (T. 60).
However, before drawing the blood sample, Mr. Hollis, a
physician's assistant, asked defendant if he would consent to
giving a sample of blood (T. 10, 13). Mr. Hollis's request was
pursuant to the Bullfrog Clinic's policy that an alcohol blood
test may be made only at the request of law enforcement personnel
and with the consent of the patient (See Addendum "D"; Policy).
In response to Hollis's request, defendant said, "Yes. Go ahead

-20-
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Addendum M E"; Findings, Conclusions). £f. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1965) (compelled blood test based
upon probable cause was reasonable where the blood was taken by a
physician in a hospital according to accepted medical practices).
Accordingly, the blood test was properly obtained and correctly
ruled.
In the instant case, the State put on clear evidence of
consent and the judge found consent to be present (T. 13, 85-86).
See Pascoe, 774 P.2d at 514.

In light of the unimpeached

evidence that defendant consented to the blood test, this Court
should not disturb the lower court's factual finding of consent.
See State v. Kelly, 770 P.2d 98, 99 (Utah 1988) (citing State v.
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the lower court's denial of the motion to suppress and
/^

remand the case for trial.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ ^ X " d a y of September,
1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

__2=%*, J£^k2&~
DAN R.

LARSEN

Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM B

VEHICLE INVENTORY
SUBJECT: MICHAEL STERGER, BLUE BRONCO
CASE# 89-150
VEHICLE REMOVED FROM SCENE OF ACCIDENT-ON BURR TRAIL.
VEHICLE WAS TOWED/STORED FOR SAFE KEEPING, AND A SUBSEQUENT
INVENTORY OF THE VEHICLE WAS MADE FOR THAT REASON.
1-TARP
1 DUFFLE TYPE BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING, 1-PR. BINOCULARS, 1-MAG-LIGHT
1-SLEEPING BAG, 1-PR. TENNIS SHOES.
MISC. FOOD & KITCHEN ITEMS THRU-OUT VEHICLE
1-PR. SUNGLASSES WXCASE
2-AIR MATTRESSES
2-SKI ROPES
1-AIR PUMP
1-BAG OF ROCKS
1-FOLDING SHOVEL
1-PKG. MATCHES
1-FIRST AID KIT
1-MIRROR
1-SET OF BOATING BOOKS, OTHER MISC. BOOKS
1-AIR COMPRESSOR, LIGHTER TYPE
4-LAWN CHAIRS
1-BROWN BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING
2-PR. SUNGLASSES
1-PR. THONGS
1-BACKGAMMON GAME SET
1-TENT W/CASE
1-GREEN LAUNDRY TYPE BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING, 1-FOLDING SAW, 1-RED
BOAT FLAG,
1-LARGE TUPPERWARE
CONTAINER W/MISC. DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, SEEDS, ETC.
1-TOOL BOX W/MISC. TOOLS
1-PR. JUMPER CABLES
1-BLUE BAG W/MISC. PERSONAL ITEMS, CONTACT LENS CASE, MINI-MAG
LIGHT, MISC. LOOSE CHANGE
1-BROWN CANVAS BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING
3-PILLOWS
1-LARGE FOOD COOLER W/MISC. POP, 16 CANS OF BUDWEISER BEER
3-QTS. OIL
2-SLEEPING BAGS
1-FLASHLIGHT
MISC. TRASH BAGS
1-TRASH BAG CONTAINING MISC. TOOLS(SOCKETS)
1-AIR MATTRESS (UNOPENED)
1-PR. SHOES
1-FISHING BOX W/MISC. LURES, ETC.
2-WATER JUGS
2-BLANKETS

2-BUDGIE CORDS

JE5ES5S

INVENTORY (CONT.)
1-PURSE/BAG W/MISC. BOOKS, CLOTHING
2-BOXES .38CAL AMMO
2-BOXES .357CAL AMMO
5-CAN COOLERS
1-ROLL OF TAPE
1-SHEET
1-LARGE WATER JUG
1-TOW STRAP
1-BOX W/MEDICINES,BANDAGES,SUNTAN LOTIONS, ETC.
1-BROWN CAMERA CASE W/MISC. FILM, 2-FLASHERS, 1-X-TRA LENS,
1-CANNON AE-1 CAMERA, 1-PLASTIC FILM CANISTER W/GREEN LEAFY
SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA).
i-DECK OF CARDS
i-ZOOM LENS
MISC. FOOD CONTAINERS, MAPS
2-PR. GLOVES
1-CASSETTE CASE W/30 CASSETTE TAPES, 1-COMPASS, 2-LIGHTERS
1-COBRA C.B. RADIO
1-KODAK CAMERA
1-CANNON AE-1 CAMERA (LOOSE)
3-ONE DOLLAR BILLS IN GLOVE BOX (*3.00)
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE GIVEN TO ME AT THE SCENE OF THE
ACCIDENT BY MR. STER6ER, HE ASKED THAT I SECURE THEM. THESE
ITEMS WERE LATER, TURNED OVER TO CARL HUNT, TO BE STORED ALONG
WITH STERGER'S VEHICLE. MR. STERGER WITNESSED THE ABOVE.
1-GRAY CASE W/1-KNIFE, 2-BOXES 9MM AMMO, 3-BOXES OF FILM, 1-9MM
S&W AUTOMATIC PISTOL.
1-GRAY CASE W/1-RUGER .357 MAG. REVOLVER, 2-LOOSE-.38CAL BULLETS.
ALL DRUG/ALCOHOL
EVIDENCE.

ITEMS

REMOVED

FROM

VEHICLE

AND

PLACED INTO

WITNESSES TO INITIAL INVENTORY (AT SCENE): CARL HUNT, JAN HUNT.
WITNESS TO REMAINDER OF INVENTORY (AT IMPOUND YARD): CARL HUNT.

ADDENDUM C

Garfield Ootnty Sheriff Department
4.03 Court Cases and Appearances
(1) Employees shall not negotiate any canpronise or arrangement permitting
any person to escape the penalty of the law or far any reason interfere with the
court of justice. This shall not prevent any employee from cooperating with the
* County Attorney in te^ interest of justice.
(2) Deputies appearing in cases before the courts shall be punctual.
They stall dress in uniform.
(3) Deputies shall properly prepare cases with which they are involved
and shall arrange for presentation in court of all property to be used as
evidence.
(4) At all times employees shall testify with accuracy and truth and
conduct themselves in a professional manner and in accordance with the law
enforcement code of ethics.
4.04 Search and Rescuse Operations
Search and rescue operations shall not be initiated by enployees without
«^the approval of the Sheriff or Chief Deputy. In lefe-threatening situations,
the deputy shall act in the best interest of the victim, notifying supervisors
as soon as possible.
4.05 Vehicle Inventories
(1) Any vehicle impounded shall be inventoried. A written inventory shall
be made of all contents of vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers.
The truck and also any compartments shall be opened and the contents inventoried.
All evidence seized in any inventory shall be placed in the evidence locker. Such
record shrill become a part of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes
from one person to another, the person taking custody of the vehicle shall also
assume custody of the contents by placing his/her signature on the inventory list.
(2) When a vehicle is removed on a hold-far-owner basis, immediate steps
shall be taken to locate the owner and inform him of the location of the vehicle
and how he may regain possession. If the owner cannot be located with 24 hours,
the vehicle shall be impounded.
(3) When a vehicle is impounded for Driving Under the Influence, improper
registration, stolen or abandoned, the officer shall immediately complete a
Utah State Tax Gcnmission infpound report and take to the Tax Oammission( Assessors
Office). After the impound report has been taken care of, the officer shall not
authorize the release of the vehicle without express consent of the Tax Commission
or until the $25.00 inbound fee has been paid by the owner of said vehicle.
(4) When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for hold-far-evidence, the
officer shall cause notice to be placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle
is being held as evidence and he shall immediatley advise the Sheriff and the
County Attorney. Such vehicle shall not be released without permission from
the Sheriff or County Attorney.

Policy and Procedures Manual
(5) Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the responsibility
of the owner except for hold-for-evidence and seized vehicles. In such cases
finaittzial arrangements for storage charges should be made through the County
Attorney or the Sheriff. Any vehicle impounded and stored at the Sheriff's
Inp3uod lot shall be subject to a minimum charge of $3.00 per ralander day.
Storage fees to begin on the second day of impound.
(6) All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and shall be surrendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle is released.
4.06 Hazardeous Materials Emergency Response
(1) The first officer dispatched to a hazardeous materials emergency will
approach and remain upwind(if possible) a safe distance from the spill.
(2) Tte officer will secure the scene and set up a command post at which
location dispatch will send all responding units for guidance.
(3) If the container is cm fire, withdraw from the area, call for trained
personnel, and consider area evacuation.
(4) In all cases, the incident should be handled by trained hazardeous
materials responders if possible.
(5) Once substance is identified and if there is no leaking product, no
smoke or fixe, and minor damage to container, first responder can then approach
with caution.
(6) Any fire units, ambulances, or wreckers called on the scene are to be
advised of the hazardeous situation at once.
4.07 Domestic

Disputes

It is the policy of the Garfield County Sheriff that in the event of a
domestic dispute, two(2) officers will respond, even if an officer has to be
called out.

ADDENDUM D

Eiu] If rog Clinic
Source;

Nursing Administration

Date;

Approval;

Administration

Page;

Subject;

Alcohol level blood test

6/84
1

law enforcement

Category; Policy

Clinic personnel (R.N., p . A . , N.P.) may on request from law.-, enfoi cement
personnel and with consent of the patient draw a blood sample for purposes
of Alcohol level determination. The sample will be drawn only with consent
of the patient and be given directly to the requesting officer. The clinic
is not equipped to do the analysis on site.

This is a true and correct copy as filed in our office.

^ t'c^s*
Kev i n

Poorten, Administrator

?£>

ADDENDUM E

GARFIELD COUNTY
NO, \?&fi0
FILED
FEB- 11330

WALLACE A. LEE #5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: 676-2290

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER,

Criminal No. 3368
Civil No. 3350

Defendant
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before
the above-entitled Court, Don V. Tibbs District Judge presiding,
on January 4, 1990, on defendants Motions to Suppress and
Defendant being personally present before the Coin t and
represented by his attorney Phillip L. Foremaster, and the State
of Utah being represented by Wallace -'•.

Garfield County

Attorney, and certain witnesses having beei ~^
testified, HK! ••erl.-iin exhibits having beei; submitted to the
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now
makes and enters its1 Findings of - - • -rid <'one I us:i oris of I .aw as

FINDINGS OF FACT

1..

Defendant Michael Allen Sterger, was ? :;> alleged

driver of a vehicle involved in a collision on the Note

}.=ul of

Eckroth was mjuied,

Thr-> i uJ I ision occurred on July 23, 1989,

md Michelle Eckroth allegedly later died of injuries sustained
in the collision.
2.

r^:

raper is a Garfield County Deputy

Sheriff, and is the investigating officer in this case.

Deputy

Draper is the only deputy sheriff coveiIIi the iemoter area of
Eastern Garf iel -i
3.

Dunty.

After the collision, the said Michelle F - •-

defendant and two other passengers in ihe defendants' vehicle
were transported from the scene by ambulance and were taken to
Bullfrog Clinic where all but the defendant wer e ai r 1 1 f ted 2 1 1 a
helicopter to Page Hosp

.

Defendant's vehicle was left

111lattended, and partially blocking one lane of the road, creating
a potential danger to the safety of peer
4.

* .

: .:. .

he road.

Deputy :'.-r.:ip_r impounded defendant s vehicle due to

his concern for public safety, and since defendant an.i every one
of his party had been transported away tn

--/e^e , there were

no alternative arrangements which could be made for revoval of
the vehicle.
After impounding *
collision,

•=:•;.-

it_-. scene of the

.n^er began conducting an inventory search of

-

the vehicle, for purposes of protecting himself and the Garfield
County Sheriff's Department
ins'H*-

,

e.

'• •

acuity for valuables

In conducting the inventory search

Draper substantially complied with regularized
Garfield County Sheriff's Depai: 1. oieri l

;-ep*-ity

-

As a result of this

inventory search, Deputy Draper seized a black film canister

containing a green leafy substance later analyzed and determined
to be marijuana,
6.

Deputy Draper did not continue his inventory of the

vehicle at the scene, because he was notified that Michelle
Eckroth had died, and another passenger in the vehicle was
accusing the defendant of drinking.

Deputy Draper felt compelled

to interrupt the inventory to go to Bullfrog Clinic to draw
defendant's blood for a determination of alcohol content.

There

were no other Sheriff's deputies in the area that could have
assisted Deputy Draper.
7.

Defendant's car was towed to Deputy Draper's

residence, in Ticaboo, Utah, by Karl Hunt and was secured.
8.

Defendant was at the Bullfrog Clinic when Deputy

Draper arrived.

Defendant had not been transported to Page by

helicopter with the other passengers of the vehicle and Michelle
Eckroth, due to lack of space in the helicopter.
9.

Bullfrog Clinic is a satellite clinic of Good

Samaritan Hospital Corporation in Phoenix, Arizona, and is built
on National Park Service land within the Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with
the National Park Service.
10.

The internal policy of the Bullfrog Clinic and

Good Samaritan, permits staff physician's assistants of the
Bullfrog Clinic to draw blood for investigative purposes at the
request of a law enforcement officer, and with the consent of the
patient.
11.

Defendant was told by Deputy Draper that he was

required to submit to a blood test since he was the driver of a
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death of a
passenger.

Defendant submitted to the blood test.
12.

Prior to drawing the blood, additional consent of

the defendant was obtained by Bullfrog Clinic Physician's Assistant Peter Hollis.
13.

Peter Hollis is licensed as a Physicianfs Assis-

tant by the State of Utah to practice under the supervision and
direction of Dr. Dennis Little, a physician licensed in the State
of Utah, and on the staff of Good Samaritan Hospital in Page,
Arizona. Dr. Little was not present at the time the blood was
taken, nor was there any consultation with Dr. Little.
14.

Peter Hollis is trained and qualified to perform

venipuncture for purposes of drawing blood, by college training
in the Yale University Physician's Assistant program, and by
experience in a clinical setting.
15.

Venipuncture, including drawing of blood, is a

regular part of Peter Hollis' activities as a physician's assistant at Bullfrog Clinic.
16.

Peter Hollis was assisted in drawing the defen-

dant's blood by Pat Quinn, National Park Service Park Medic.
17.

Pat Quinn is a National Park Service certified

Level 5 Park Medic, and is trained and qualified to conduct
venipuncture and draw blood.
18.

Pat Quinn regularly draws blood in a clinical

setting as part of his normal activities as a Park Medic, and
regularly assists the physician's assistant at the Bullfrog

Service has adopted policy guidelines which allow Level 5 certified Park Medics to conduct venipuncture.

Local Glen Canyon

Office orders also allow Level 5 certified Park Medics to conduct
venipuncture.
19.

Prior to attempting to insert a needle to draw

blood from defendant's veins, Physician's Assistant Peter Hollis
and Park Medic Pat Quinn cleansed the defendant's skin with
Betadine solution and water rather than alcohol, as a precaution
to avoid any possible taint of alcohol in the sample.
20.

Peter Hollis twice attempted to insert a catheter

for withdrawal of defendant's blood, but both times collapsed
defendant's vein.

He then requested Park Medic Pat Quinn to

attempt to find a vein.

Pat Quinn was successful in inserting a

catheter into defendant's vein, Peter Hollis then withdrew the
blood of defendant, inserted it into two vials, enclosed the
vials in a plastic bag and gave them directly to Deputy Shawn
Draper.
21.

Peter Hollis and Pat Quinn followed standard

medical procedures in withdrawing defendant's blood, in sanitary
conditions at the Bullfrog Clinic, and took every precaution to
obtain a proper blood sample.
22.
Burr Trail

Due to the remoteness of the area surrounding the

and the Bullfrog area, the Bullfrog Clinic was the

only reasonable facility where defendant could have been taken
for blood to be drawn. The closest alternative facility was
approximately 2 hours away.
23.

Approximately

two (2) days later, after

investigating the scene of the accident, and transporting the
defendant to Koosharem,Utah, Deputy Draper returned to finish his
inventory of defendant's vehicle, and the vehicle was moved
approximately sixty (60) miles to Hanksville, Utah, and placed in
the State impound yard.
24.

Prior to resuming his inventory, Deputy Draper

contacted Garfield County Sheriff Robert V. Judd, who indicated
that defendant's vehicle had been seized by the State of Utah,
due to the marijuana found in the first inventory and there was
no need to obtain a search warrant to resume the inventory.
25.

Deputy Draper continued his inventory for the

purpose of protecting himself and Garfield County Sheriff Department from liability for valuables inside defendant's vehicle.
26.

During the resumed inventory procedure, Deputy

Draper seized a tupperware container containing items later
analyzed to be drug paraphernalia.
27.

The inventory search of the defendant's vehicle

was reasonable and essentially in conformance with Garfield
County inventory procedures.
From the foregoing facts, the Court makes and enters
it's conclusions of law as follows:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), states that only a

physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person
authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request
of a Dear.A r\-F-fi ~~—

2.

The Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court, in the

case of Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P2d 299 (1975), in interpreting the
predecessor to the current statute which is substantially similar
to the current Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), expressly found that
the drawing of blood from a human being constitutes the practice
of medicine and "falls within the purview of service rendered by
a physician's assistant.... acting under the supervision and
direction of a physician."
3.

In this case, due to the circumstances of the

remote location, lack of reasonable alternative facilities to
draw the blood, and due to the fact that the blood was drawn by a
State licensed physician's assistant acting under the supervision
and direction of a licensed physician and a certified Park Medic,
fully trained and qualified to draw blood, since conducting
venipuncture is a routine part of their respective positions,
since Bullfrog Clinic and National Park Service policies permit
the drawing of blood, since standard medical procedures were
followed in sanitary environments, and all precautions were taken
to avoid any possible contamination of the blood sample, the
Court finds that the physician's assistant, Peter Hollis, and
Park Medic, Pat Quinn, were qualified to draw defendant's blood,
and the resulting blood samples were properly obtained and should
not be suppressed as evidence.
4.

The Court finds that the defendant twice voluntari-

ly consented to having his blood drawn.
5.

The Court finds there was reasonable and proper

justification for impoundment of defendant's vehicle for public

safety reasons, and further finds that the inventory search
resulting in the seizure of marijuana and drug paraphernalia was
reasonable, and essentially in conformance with a regularized set
of procedures which adequately guarded against arbitrariness.
6.

The Court finds that Deputy Draper acted in good

faith, in conducting the inventory search of defendant's vehicle
with a purpose of protecting himself and the Garfield County
Sheriff's Department from liability for valuables inside the
vehicle.
In accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court finds that defendantCs Motions to
Suppress the blood sample taken from the defendant and to suppress items removed from defendant's vehicle pursuant to Deputy
Draper's inventory search should be denied.
DATED this 1st day of February, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and coihs^ct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this the 1st day
of February, 1990, addressed as follows:

Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 572
S t . George, Utah 84770
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Secretary
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